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NOTES
Widows' Allowances and Marital Deductions-The
Date-of-Death Rule
In every state there are statutes that provide for widows' allowances in an attempt to assure adequate support for widows during
the time it takes to settle their husbands' estates. 1 A common feature
in most of these state support statutes is that the local probate judge
is permitted to order an amount which the court finds to be reasonably necessary for the maintenance of the widow during the period
of settlement to be set aside for her from the rest of the estate.2 The
maximum amount permitted, the method of payment, the duration
of the allowance, the extent to which the probate court may later
modify the award, and the factors to be considered in the initial
determination of the award differ greatly from state to state.8 In
addition, only a few statutes and a limited number of cases have
dealt with the question of when, if ever, the widow may be conI. See ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 661-705 (1960); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.30.120-.140 (1962);
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-513, -515 to -516 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2501 (Supp.
1963); CAL. PROB, CODE §§ 680-82; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 152-12-16 (1953); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-250 (Supp. 1964); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2307 (1953), as
amended, DEL. CoDE ANN. § 2307 (Supp. 1962); FLA. STAT. § 733.20(l)(d) (1964);
GA. CODE ANN. § ll3-1002 (Supp. 1963); HAWAII REv. LAws § 317-21 (1955); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 15-501, -503 to -505 (1947) ; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 178, 180-82 (1963);
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 6-402 to -403 (1953), as amended, !ND. ANN. STAT, § 6-402 (Supp.
1964); IOWA CODE §§ 633.374-.375 (1963); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-403 (1949); KY.
REv. STAT. § 391.030 (1962); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2382, 3252 (West 1952); LA. CoDE
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3321 (1961); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 156, §§ 17, 19 (1954); MD,
ANN. CODE art. 93, §§ 336-37 (1957): MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 196, § 2 (1955); MICH. COMP.
LAws § 702.68 (Supp. 1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.15 (Supp. 1964); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 561, 564 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.260 (Supp. 1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.300
(1956); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 91-2404 to -2405 (1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-103
(1956); NEV. REv. STAT.§§ 146.010, 146.030-.040 (1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN, §§ 560:1-:2
(1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3A:8-6 to -7 (1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-4-1 (1953); N.Y.
SuRR. CT. ACT § 200; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-15 to -31 (1950), as amended, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 30-15 to -30 (Supp. 1963) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-16-10 (1960); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 2ll7.20-.22 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 3ll, 314 (1961); ORE.
REV. STAT. §§ ll6.010-.015 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.2ll-.215 (1950), as
amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.211 (Supp. 1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-10-3
(Supp. 1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-ll (1962); S.D. CODE §§ 35.1304, 35.1306 (Supp. 1960);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 30-801 to -807 (1955), as amended, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 30-804
to -807 (Supp. 1964); TEX. PROB. CoDE ANN. §§ 286-87 (1956) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-8-1
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 404 (Supp. 1963); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64-120 to -121
(1950), as amended, VA. CODE ANN.§ 64-120 (Supp. 1964); WASH. REv. CODE § 11.52.040
(1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4136 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 313.15(2) (1958); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2-210 to ·211 (1957).
2. See, e.g., CAL. PROB, CoDE §§ 680-82; MICH. COMP. LAws § 702.68 (Supp. 1956);
N.Y. SuRR. CT. ACT § 200.
3. See statutes cited note 1 supra. Cases illustrating the factors considered by •
probate courts in determining the amount of an award are collected in Annot.,
90 A.L.R.2d 687 (1963) •
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sidered as having a vested and indefeasible interest in the support
allowance. 4
The deductibility of these allowances as a marital deduction on
the decedent's federal estate tax return has been the subject of much
controversy in recent years. According to section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code, the value of any interest in property which
passes from the decedent to the surviving spouse may be deducted
as a marital deduction from the gross estate.I• However, deductibility
is limited in two ways: Marital deductions may not exceed fifty per
cent of the value of the decedent's adjusted gross estate, 6 and under
the "terminable interest rule" deductions are not permitted for
any interest passing to the surviving spouse which will fail or terminate upon the happening, or failure to happen, of any event or
contingency. 7 Since 1950, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 697 (1960); IOWA CODE § 633.374 (1963); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 525.15 (Supp. 1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-121 (Supp. 1964). See cases
collected in 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL GIFT&: EsrATE TAXATION § 29.27 (Supp. 1964); Annot.,
144 A.L.R. 270 (1943).
In several states where the statute uses words like "shall be set aside" or "is
entitled to" to describe the widow's interest, or where a statutory minimum is provided,
the courts have held that the surviving spouse has a vested interest in an allowance
at the date of deceqent's death. See, e.g., In the Matter of Estate of Dillman, 8 Ill.
App. 2d 239, 131 N.E.2d 634 (1956) (court upheld probate court's grant of $1000,
the statutory minimum, to the estate of a husband who had died only a few hours
after his wife); In re Croke's Estate, 155 Ohio St. 434, 99 N.E.2d 843 (1951) (court
held that widow's estate was entitled to a full year's allowance under Ohio statute,
even though she had lived only three months after decedent's death. See Note, 29
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 270 (1951), which analyzes the possible interpretations of the Illinois
statute. Although no court has expressly ruled on the nature of the allowance in
Michigan in the situation where the widow died soon after the death of her husband,
the court in Estate of Reynolds v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Mich. 1960),
held that the widow has a vested right to an allowance for one year. This holding
was criticized in Allan, The Michigan Family Allowance-Some Pertinent Questions,
2 MICHIGAN PROBATE GUIDE FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITTONER § 3.100 (1964) ,
5. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(a). See generally LoWNDES &: KRAMER, FEDERAL
EsrATE AND GIFT TAXES §§ 17.1-.23 (2d ed. 1962); 2 BEVERIDGE, FEDERAL EsrATE TAXATION §§ 14.01-.10 (1956); Polasky, Estate Tax Marital Deduction in Estate Planning,
Tax Counselor's Q., June 1959, p. I.
6. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(c).
In community property states, generally the husband and wife each own one-half
of the community property. At death, therefore, only that party's half interest is
considered part of his estate. By allowing a deduction of up to fifty per cent of the
adjusted gross estate for any interest passing to the surviving spouse and by restricting
the use of this deduction in community property states, the marital deduction permits
the taxpayer in a common-law state to reduce his taxable estate to the approximate
level it would have been had he lived in a community property state. See INT. REv.
CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(c)(2) (B)-(C).
Varying views have been expressed on the feasibility and desirability of the
intended equalization. See, e.g., United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. ll8, 128 (1963); S. REP.
No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 28 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 75 (1948); Lowe, Marital Deduction-Terminable Interests-Missouri Law,
29 Mo. L. REv. 13 (1964); Polasky, supra note 5, at 3.
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b):
"(I) GENERAL RuLE.-Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an
event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an
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has regularly disallowed deductions for widows' allowances, claiming
they are terminable interests. The courts, in reviewing the Commissioner's rulings, have consequently been faced with the problem
of ascertaining the proper time at which the terminability of the
widow's allowance should be measured. Conflicting solutions to this
problem have produced the incongruous result of allowances being
declared deductible in some cases but not in others, even when
similar state statutes are involved. 8
Three different approaches-time-of-payment, date-of-decree,
and date-of-death-have been utilized by the courts to determine
the time at which a widow's award must be vested and indefeasible
in order to avoid the stricture of the terminable interest rule. The
one used least by the courts, although it would almost always result
in the deductibility of the allowance, is the time-of-payment approa~h.9 Under ·this theory, examination of terminability does not
occur until the widow actually receives each payment. Advocates
of this approach argue that the interest cannot be categorized prior
to the time of payment because no interest passes to the widow
prior to that time. 10 This argument, however, is difficult to maininterest passing to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, co deduction shall
be allowed under this section with respect to such interest-

"(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent
to any person other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse); and
"(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may
possess or enjoy any part of such property after such termination or failure of
the interest so passing to the surviving spouse; and no deduction shall be allowed
with respect to such interest (even if such deduction is not disallowed under
subparagraphs (A) and (B))"(C) if such interest 1s to be acquired for the surviving spouse, pursuant to
directions of the decedent, by his executor or by the trustee of a trust."
See generally 2 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 14.02; LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit.
supra note 5, §§ 17.9-.23.
The essential purpose of the terminable interest rule is to assure that the value
of the property interest which passes to the surviving spouse, for which a deduction
is claimed, will be included in the estate of that survivor. See Proctor D. Rensenhouse,
31 T.C. 818, 828 (1959) (concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part, opinion); S. REP.
No. 1013, supra note 6, at 28; Bush, Widow's Exemption or Allowance and the Marital
Deduction, N.Y.U. 22D INsr. ON FED. TAX, 1131, 1135 (1964); Luxemburger &: Durrett,
How To Use Widows' Statutory Awards To Recover "Overlooked" Marital Deduction,
20 J. TAXATION 34, 35-36 (1964).
S. Compare Estate of Cunha v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1961), with King v. Wiseman, 147 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Okla.
1956). See also Proctor D. Rensenhouse, supra note 7, at 825-26.
9. Some lower federal courts have adopted this approach. See, e.g., Shafer v.
United States, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 'f 11949 (S.D. Iowa 1960), rev'd per curiam, 293 F.2d
629 (8th Cir. 1961); Quivey v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 433 (D. Neb. 1959), rev'd,
292 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1961). An examination at this time would always reveal the
interest to be then nonterminable and vested unless it were subject to an unusual
condition subsequent.
10. See, e.g., Shafer v. United States, supra note 9; Quivey v. United States, supra
note 9, at 439; Proctor D. Rensenhouse, 31 T.C. 818, 828 (1959) (concurring, in part,
and dissenting, in part, opinion).
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tain. It is more accurate to recognize that the widow receives her
interest in an allowance from the statute at the time of her husband's
death, or at least from the probate court when it determines the size
of her allowance, rather than later when her interest is satisfied by
actual payment.
A second approach, one which has attracted considerable judicial
support, is to determine terminability. at the time of the probate
court decree. 11 Use of the date-of-decree approach would allow deductions in those states where the support award is vested and indefeasible once ordered, even though it is contingent prior to the order.
Unlike the date-of-death rule, this approach would permit deductions for allowances in states which make the widow's award contingent upon her filing an application for it, and in those states
which terminate the widow's rights if she dies or remarries it
would permit deductions for payments decreed retroactively for
the widow's support between her husband's death and the allowance decree. However, as with the time-of-payment approach,
characterization of the interest only at the date of the court
order ignores the fact that the widow had an interest prior to
the date of the decree and it merely applying to the court to have
the amount of that interest ascertained. In addition, the date-ofdecree approach is unfair in that the size of the deduction may be
dependent upon when the widow elects to apply for the award. 12
For example, in a state in which the widow must survive in order
to retain her interest, a widow who requires funds for sustenance
and must apply for the award immediately after the decedent's
death will not get a deduction. On the other hand, a widow who
can afford to wait and apply later will be permitted to take a deduction for retroactive payments decreed for the period between her
husband's death and the decree.
The third approach, which characterizes the interest as of the
date of the decedent's death, was recently adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Jackson v. United States. 13 The Jackson
case dealt with the deductibility of a widow's allowance awarded
by a California probate court fourteen months after the death of
petitioner's husband. Petitioner urged the Court to adopt the dateof-decree approach, which would have allowed a deduction for all
11. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'! Bank 8e Trust Co., 297 F.2d 312 (5th Cir.
1961); Molner v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Michael G. Rudnick,
36 T.C. 1021 (1961); Margaret R. Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1960).
12. See Note, Deductibility of the Widow's Allowance Under the Marital Deduction, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1188, 1198 (1961).
13. 376 U.S. 503 (1964). Mr. Justice Douglas dissented without opinion. The date
of death approach was also used in Estate of Darby v. Wiseman, 323 F.2d 792 (10th
Cir. 1963); United States v. Quivey, 292 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1961); Estate of Cunha v.
Commissioner, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1961); United
States Nat'l Bank v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 332 (D. Ore. 1960) .
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payments decreed for the fourteen-month period between the
husband's death and the decree. Insisting that the date-of-death
approach should be adopted, the Government relied on California
decisions holding that widows' allowances abate upon the death or
remarriage of the widow14 and argued that even though the widow
in Jackson had survived unmarried to the date of the decree, as of
the date of death there was a possibility of her death or remarriage.
Since the widow's right to payments would have been defeated had
this possibility occurred, the Government concluded that her interest was terminable. 15
In support of its adoption of the date-of-death approach, the
,court placed heavy emphasis on the Senate Committee report
accompanying the Revenue Act of 1948, which expressly states that
in determining whether an interest in property is terminable, the
situation must be viewed as of the date 'of the decedent's death. 16
The Court also relied upon analogies to cases that have denied
marital deductions for interests which were conditioned on the
widow's surviving the date of settlement17 and for interests which
were limited in the case of her subsequent incapacity.18 In addition,
implicit in the Court's decision is the recognition that some interest
in the widow's allowance passes to the widow at the time of her
husband's death. Since the critical factor in applying the terminable
interest rule is the possibility of failure of the interest rather than
actual failure, 19 this interest should be classified when it passes
and the date-of-death rule should be applied.
Under present law, the Jackson case was correctly decided.
However, its adoption of the date-of-death approach will eliminate
almost all deductions for widows' allowances.20 In nearly every state
these allowances, at the time of the husband's death, are subject to
a number of contingencies, each of which may render the interest
terminable. For example, a number of statutes provide for failure
of the widow's interest upon her death or remarriage, and, in
many states, the widow must specifically apply for the award and
her failure to do so defeats it. 21 Only two states presently provide for
14. See, e.g., Estate of Blair,.42 Cal. 2d 728, 269 P.2d 612 (1954); In the Matter of
Estate of Hamilton, 66 Cal. 576, 6 Pac. 493 (1885).
15. Brief for Respondent, pp. 16-17, Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964).
16. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 508 (1964); S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 10 (1948).
17. See, e.g., Bookwalter v. Lamar, 323 F.2d 664 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v.
Mappes, 318 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963).
18. See, e.g., Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955).
19. See statute cited note 7 supra. See, e.g., Estate of Darby v. Wiseman, 323 F.2d
792 (10th Cir. 1963); Kasper v. Kellar, 217 F.2d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 1954); 4 MERTENS,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 29.23, at 517 (1959).
20. See William A. Landers, 38 T.C. 828, 836 (1962) .
21. In United States Nat'! Bank v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 332, 337-38 (D. Ore.
1960), the court held that the requirement that the widow apply for the allowance
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specific amounts to be set aside unconditionally at death for the
support of the widow. 22 In several other states there are statutory
provisions for review of the awards at a later time by the probate
judge.28 Under these provisions, it would appear that there is no
certainty, as of the date of death, that any appreciable allowance
will actually be paid even in those states where the statutes or
cases indicate that there is a vested right in the widow at death. 24
Seemingly, this uncertainty would indicate terminability. Even in
states where there is a statutory minimum award, the provision for
review would seem to preclude a deduction of more than this minimum, if the situation is viewed at the date of death.25 In most of
the remaining states the probate judge has some discretion in
determining amounts which are reasonably necessary for the maintenance of the surviving spouse. As of the date of death, therefore,
the widow's exact interest is unknown and terminable.
In order to make widows' allowances deductible, state statutes
could be amended so that the awards would vest absolutely on the
date of death. 26 However, by so doing, many state legislatures would
be destroying the flexibility which presently permits a probate
court to mold its decree to meet the changing needs of the widow.
Therefore, if deductibility is to be restored, the Internal Revenue
Code rather than the state support statutes should be amended.
An examination of the history of the tax treatment of widows'
allowances indicates a continuing congressional intent to permit
was one factor indicating terminability. However, such an argument was rejected by
the court in Proctor D. Rensenhouse, 31 T.C. 818 (1959).
It has been contended that the date-of-death rule could eliminate deductions for
other elective rights such as dower. See Bush, supra note 7, at 1146-47.
22. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-403 (1949); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, §§ 336-37 (1957).
23. Some states allow either an increase or decrease in the award as the situation
requires. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 180 (1963); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2117.22
(Page 1954). Other states allow increases only. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-515
(1956); IOWA CODE § 633.375 (1963).
24. See note 4 supra. The court in In re Croke's Estate, 155 Ohio St. 434, 99 N.E.2d
843 (1951), although holding the widow's allowance to be vested at decedent's death,
acknowledged that in a proper case the award could be decreased.
25. Statutes providing for minimum awards include ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2501
(Supp. 1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1002 (Supp. 1963); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 178
(1963).
In Molner v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ill. 1959), the court ruled that
the provision for review of the award did not affect the vested nature of a $25,000
allowance, although in Illinois the minimum award is $1000. However, the court's
authority, Hodson v. Hodson, 277 Ill. 137, 115 N.E. 159 (1917), held only that the
petition for reduction in that case was not filed within a reasonable time after the
initial grant of the award. Thus, there is a possibility in Illinois that a large award
may be decreased to the minimum upon timely application. This would seem to
make the holding in Molner questionable.
26. The official comments accompanying IowA CODE § 633.374 indicate that the
insertion of the sentence "such allowance to the surviving spouse shall not abate
upon .•• death or remarriage of such spouse" was made specifically to qualify the
allowance for a marital deduction.
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deductions for these awards. Section 812(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 permitted widows' allowances to be deducted as
an expense to the estate.27 In 1948, while retaining section 812(b)(5),
Congress added the marital deduction and terminable interest
provision to the Code.28 The Senate Report accompanying the
Revenue Act of 1948 indicated that widows' allowances were not
deductible under the marital deduction provision.29 Since section
812(b)(5) was still in effect, it would appear that the Senate Report
was aimed at preventing a double deduction. When section 812(b)(5)
was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1950,30 the congressional reports stated that widows' support allowances would henceforth be
deductible under the recently enacted marital deduction section,
subject to the "conditions and limitations" therein.31 Subsequent
attempts to provide more clearly for the deductibility of widows'
allowances were defeated. In 1954, opponents of proposed changes
persuaded their colleagues that these changes might have the undesirable effect of endangering rather than assuring the deductibility of the allowance. 32 Five years later another proposal was
introduced, but after passage by the House it was never reported
out of the Senate Committee on Finance.33 The award of a widow's
allowance is essentially beyond the control of the decedent. Because
of this similarity to other estate expenses, Congress has consistently
considered that some type of deduction should be allowed for
estate assets expended in such a manner. However, since the decision in Jackson, it can no longer be said that widows' support allowances will be deductible without action on the part of Congress.
The proper guideline for a future amendment to the marital
deduction section would appear to be that of the unsuccessful
House bill of 1959.34 Under its provisions any amounts paid to the
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 812(b)(5), 53 Stat. 123.
28. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e) (3) (now INT. REv. Com;; OF 1954, § 2056).
29. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 3 (1948).
30. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 502, 64 Stat. 962. The repeal was prompted
by excessive deductions in states where liberal allowances were granted. See S. REP.
No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1950).
31. See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 2319,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1950).
Since the major cause for repeal of § 812 (b) (5) was the liberality of the allowances
being granted, it would seem that coverage by the fifty per cent ceiling for marital
deductions was the "condition and limitation" primarily intended.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91-92, A319 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1954).
33. See H.R. 2573, 86th Cong., bt Sess. (1959); H.R. REP. No. 818, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-5 (1959). See note 34 infra.
34. H.R. 2573, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (Proposed additions to this previously
unsuccessful amendment proposal are included in brackets.) :
Section 2056(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to limitation in the
case of life estate or other terminable interest) is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new paragraph:
"(7) ALLOWANCE OR AWARD ro SURVIVING SPOUSE.-For purposes of ithis sub-
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surviving spouse, or that spouse's estate, within fifteen months from
the date of death would be exempt from the operation of the
terminable interest rule. It would appear that this amendment
could be strengthened by also exempting those awards which are
indefeasibly vested in the widow within that time period. In
this manner, those allowances which have been ordered and which
are not subject to modification, but which have not been paid for
some reason, will also be deductible.
Under an amendment of the type proposed, allowances would
continue to be controlled by the fifty per cent limitation.35 Thus,
only amounts of awards which fill the gap between other qualified
bequests to the widow and the fifty per cent ceiling would be deductible and the amount an estate could save in taxes through a
generous court award would still be limited. In addition, a considerable degree of administrative convenience would be achieved
by limiting the exempt awards to those paid or indefeasibly vested
within fifteen months, the required date for filing the estate tax
retum. 86 With the fifteen-month limitation, a definite and readily
ascertainable amount could be entered as a marital deduction for
the widow's allowance, thus eliminating the necessity for amending
the return. Since most awards are either paid or indefeasibly vested
within fifteen months,87 the time limit would not seriously curtail
deductibility and would not unduly restrict the states' ability to
retain flexible support statutes without denying a tax benefit to
the estate. Furthermore, the proposal would, in some measure,
equalize the deductibility of widows' allowances among the states
section, an allowance or award made after the decedent's death pursuant to local
law for the support of the surviving spouse during the settlement of the decedent's
estate, shall not be considered as an interest which will terminate or fail to
the extent that the allowance or award is in fact paid to •the surviving spouse,
or to the estate of such spouse, [or to the extent to which a vested and indefeasible
right to a specific amount has accrued to the surviving spouse,] within 15 months
after the date of the decedent's death."
The underlying reasons for the proposed amendment are discussed in H.R. REP.
No. 818, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1959).
A similar proposal made by the American Bar Association in 1959 inserted
"reasonable" to modify "allowance or award," and it did not have any time limit.
See American Bar Ass'n, Section of Taxation, Program and Committee Reports to
be Presented at the Twentieth Annual Meeting 55-56, Aug. 1959. The use of reasonableness seems to conform to the unofficial criterion now being used by tax examiners
in disallowing deductions. See Mahon, The Widow's Allowance and the Federal Tax
Laws, 41 TAXES 692, 694-95 (1963). However, it would appear that the addition of a
reasonableness requirement would create more problems than it would solve. Adequate
protection against excessive awards is presently afforded by the fifty per cent limitation,
and addition of the term reasonable would tend to encourage litigation in an attempt
to determine its precise meaning.
For another proposed amendment, see H.R. 10591, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 60 (1960).
35. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954-, § 2056 (c).
36. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6075(a).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 818, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959).
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since exemption from the terminable interest rule would negate
much of the impact of the diversities in the state laws on these
deductions.
The Jackson decision should serve to alert Congress to the
necessity for clarifying legislation in this area. Seemingly, an amendment of the type proposed would most effectively further the longstanding congressional policy of permitting deductions for widows'
allowances, while permitting states to retain their present support
standing congressional policy of permitting deductions for widows'
needs of the surviving spouse.

